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Wright v. Angelone
151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998)
I. Facts
On October 13, 1989, Dwayne Allen Wright ("Wright' followed Saba
Tekle ("Tekle") to the parking lot of her apartment building. When Tekle exited
the automobile, Wright approached her, displayed a gun, and demanded the keys
to Tekle's automobile. Tekle dropped the keys to the ground and Wright re-
trieved them. He then ordered Tekle to take off her clothes so that they could
have sex in a wooded area behind Tekle's apartment building. Tekle removed
her shoes and underpants and then began screaming and running towards her
apartment building. Wright chased her into the apartment building and fired two
shots at Tekle. One of the bullets struck Tekle, and she died from the wound.
After firing the shots, Wright left in the automobile that Tekle had been driving.1
Given Wright's age at the time of the crimes, seventeen, the Commonwealth
initiated criminal proceedings in the juvenile court. The first two petitions to the
juvenile court alleged that Wright had murdered Tekle and used a firearm to
commit the murder. The juvenile court amended the first petition to charge
Wright with capital murder because the murder occurred in commission of or in
attempt to commit a robbery. The Commonwealth then obtained a third petition
in juvenile court which charged Wright with robbery.!
On November 15,1990, the Commonwealth gave formal notice of its intent
to transfer the charges against Wright which originated in juvenile court to circuit
court and its intent to seek the death penalty. The juvenile court granted
Wright's motion for a sanity and competency hearing and also held a probable
cause hearing. After finding probable cause on each of the three charges, the
juvenile court then granted the Commonwealth's motion to transfer. The
Commonwealth sought and received an indictment in the circuit court which
charged Wright with (1) murder in the course of a robbery; (2) robbery; (3) use
of a firearm during a robbery; (4) murder subsequent to attempted rape; and (5)
attempted rape. A jury found Wright guilty on all counts and then recommended
the death penalty for Wright based on the future dangerousness aggravating
factor.3
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Wright's convic-
tions and sentence. The United States Supreme Court vacated Wright's sentence
1. Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151,154-55 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Wright, 151 F.3d at 155.
3. Id. at 155-56.
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based on Simmons v. South Caroina.4 On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed the sentence, concluding that Wright was not ineligible for parole.
The Supreme Court then denied certiorari. Wright filed state habeas petitions
which were dismissed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. After Wright filed his
federal habeas petition on March 14, 1997, a United States magistrate recom-
mended denial of habeas corpus relief. On September 12,1997, the district court
adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the federal habeas
petition.' Wright appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district
court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus holding that: (1) the Virginia circuit
court did not lack jurisdiction because Wright did not present any evidence to
show that the Virginia circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction over the five charges
resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice; (2) Wright's Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause challenge to the Supreme Court of Virginia's
ruling that Wright could be tried as an adult, even though the Commonwealth
failed to conduct proper transfer proceedings, a challenge raised in Virginia's
state habeas proceedings, cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief; (3)
Wright's Sixth Amendment claim of a denial of a fair and impartial trial, based
on alleged intimidation of a juror, was procedurally defaulted; and (4) Wright did
not receive ineffective assistance from his counsel.6 The court further ruled that
the district, court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wright's motion for
funds to hire a neurologist.7
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
Before examining the merits of Wright's habeas corpus petition, the court
sought to determine the applicable standard of review under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").' The court cited Green v.
French9 which interpreted AEDPA to say that habeas relief will only be granted
if the state courts have decided an issue on the merits by applying Supreme Court
of the United States precedent in an unreasonable way. Wright objected to the
use of this extremely deferential standard because the Supreme Court of Virginia
4. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that where future dangerousness is at issue and state law
prohibits parole if defendant is sentenced to life in prison, due process requires that jury be
informed - either by instruction or by argument of counsel - that the only alternative to a death
sentence is a sentence of life without parole).
5. Wntigbt, 151 F.3d at 156.
6. Wringht, 151 F.3d at 157-63.
7. Id at 163-64.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1998).




had rejected his state habeas petition in a single paragraph and gave no detailed
explanation of the grounds for its ruling. Wright argued that because of the
limited nature of the state habeas dismissal, the court should exact a more
probing review of Wright's habeas petition and be less deferential to the minimal
decision issued by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The court ruled against Wright, acknowledging that a more detailed state
court order would make review easier, but held that the standard of review did
not change simply because of the summary opinion accompanying the state court
order. Thus, for habeas relief to be issued, the court held that it would have to
find an "unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 10 Given that future federal
habeas petitions will be governed by the deferential standards of AEDPA, as
deferentially interpreted by the deferential Fourth Circuit, the importance of
effective trial level defense is even more apparent.1
A. Lack of Trial CourtJunsdiction: Raising a Federal Claim
Wright argued that because he was seventeen at the time the criminal acts
occurred, any charges brought against him had to have originated in juvenile
court. Wright contended that under Buroootv. Commonwealth,' for the circuit court
to gain jurisdiction over any charges against a juvenile, those charges would have
to first be brought in juvenile court and then transferred to the circuit court via
a transfer hearing. Wright argued that because the attempted rape and capital
murder subsequent to attempted rape charges originated in circuit court, and not
in juvenile court, and thus were not subject to a transfer hearing, the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction over those charges. Because the circuit court lacked jurisdic-
tion, Wright argued that he was entitled to a new trial."
In rejecting Wright's argument, the court ruled that under Estelk v. McGuire4
and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a),5 federal courts can only grant habeas relief if the
petitioner is in custody in violation of federal law.'6 Holding that Wright's
10. Wright, 151 F.3d at 157 (citing Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 894 (4th Cir. 1998)).
11. One important aspect of trial level defense is negotiation. For a more thorough discus-
sion of how to keep capital punishment out of a trial, see Lesley Meredith James, Overlooked Victories:
Techniques for Negotiating Non-capital Outcomes, CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 6, no. 2, p. 35 (1994).
12. 473 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 1996).
13. Wright, 151 F.3d at 157.
14. 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 1998).
16. The statute provides:
The Supreme Court, ajustice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 1998).
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argument, "when pared down to its core, rests solely upon an interpretation of
Virginia's case law and statutes,"' 7 the court rejected Wright's argument because
it was not cognizable at federal habeas review under Estk.8
The court's ruling on this issue shows the need for defense counsel to urge
all applicable federal grounds for all trial and appellate claims. Although absence
of state court jurisdiction is not an issue which is easily couched in federal terms,
there are three possible grounds on which absence of state court jurisdiction can
be federalized, two of which were suggested in this case.
The first potential way to federalize this issue is by making a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim based on arbitrary enforcement of a state created
right. The Burfoot decision was based on a section of the Virginia Code which
stated that all prosecutions of juveniles for criminal offenses "shall" begin by the
filing of a petition in juvenile court.'9 Thus, the Code created a statutory right or
duty for criminal prosecutions against juveniles to begin in juvenile court.
Arbitrary enforcement of this right or duty, as it seems to be the case here, would
violate a defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. This existence of this federal basis for relief is
at least implicitly recognized by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit in Dubois v. Greene.2"
A second way to federalize absence of state court jurisdiction is suggested
by Haily v. Dory.2 Wright argued that Hailky created an exception to the rule
of Estelle. In Haily, the Fourth Circuit held that in cases where non-constitu-
tional procedural errors, which did not result in violation of the defendant's
fundamental rights, are urged, only those errors which resulted in the sentencing
court having no jurisdiction to sentence the appellant are cognizable at federal
habeas proceedings.2 In Wright, however, interpreting its own holding in Haily,
the court stated that nothing in Haiky suggested that the court may resolve an
issue based on a non-constitutional procedural error contrary to the highest court
in the state absent a showing of a complete miscarriage of justice.2 However,
this is exactly what Haiky suggests. In Wright's case, the type of error was exactly
the type mentioned in Haiky, an error which robbed the trial court of its author-
ity to sentence Wright for the capital murder after attempted rape charge. The
court should not have ruled that Wright's reliance on Haily was incorrect. Thus,
17. Wright, 151 F.3d at 157.
18. Id
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260 (Michie 1996).
20. No. 97-21, 1998 WL 276282 (4th Cir. May 26, 1998). See also Case Note of Dubois v.
Greene, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 87 (1998); Otto W. Konrad, How to Look the Viginia Gft Horse in the Mouth:
Federal Due Process and Virginia's Arbitrar Abrogation of Capital Defendant's State-Created Rights, CAP.
DEF. DIG.,vol. 3, no. 2, p. 16 (1991).
21. 580 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1978).
22. Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1978).
23. Wright, 151 F!3d at 158.
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the language in Hailey suggests a second way to federalize an absence of state
court jurisdiction claim.
Finally, a third way to federalize this claim would be to argue that the state
is creating two classes of defendants in its application of the statute, thus violat-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees. It is arguable that
if the Virginia courts require compliance with the transfer statute at is sue here for
one class of defendant, non-capital defendants as in Burfoot, and does not require
compliance for another class of defendant, capital defendants as in Wright, then
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has also been violated.
Accordingly, Wright asserted that the Supreme Court ofVirginia denied him
equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
ruled in Wright's state habeas proceeding, prior to all precedent, that Wright
could be tried as an adult despite the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the
transfer provisions denoted in Burfoot.24 However, the court avoided addressing
the issue presented by Wright by relying upon the language of 28 U.S.C.A. 5
2254(a) for the proposition that the court could only grant habeas relief if
Wright, pursuant to the judgment of a state court, was in custody in violation of
federal law.
B. Violation of Sixth Amendment When Victim's Family Intimidated a Juror
Wright contended that members of the victim's family intimidated a juror,
thereby tainting the entire jury and denying him a fair and impartial jury.2 At
state habeas review the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Wright did not raise
the issue on direct appeal, and therefore, the claim was procedurally defaulted
under Slayton v. Parrigan.26 Nonetheless, Wright argued that procedural default
should not have been applied to this issue because the issue had actually been
raised and ruled upon on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
In ruling against Wright, the court cited Hars v. Reed' to hold that proce-
dural rules, such as default, cannot be questioned at federal habeas review if the
rule is based on an "adequate and independent" state ground.' An "adequate"
state ground is one which is consistently applied by the state court.3" The court
cited prior precedent to establish that the Virginia procedural default rule an-
nounced in Slayton was both adequate and independent, but failed to make any
analysis of the rule in its decision.3 1 The court concluded that it could not review
24. Id at 159.
25. Id
26. 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974) (holding that claims that could have been raised on direct
appeal, but were not, cannot be raised on state collateral review).
27. Wight, 151 F.3d at 159.
28. 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989).
29. Wnrigbt, 151 F.3d at 159.
30. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (citations omitted).
31. Mu'Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192,196 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 138 (1997).
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Wright's Sixth Amendment claim because the state court used an adequate and
independent state procedural rule to default the claim.
The court obviously should have "questioned" the Slayton rule at federal
habeas review because it was quite possible that the rule was not consistently
applied as required by the adequacy prong in Harris. According to the court's
own language, the Slayton procedural default rule is to be applied when an issue
has not been raised on direct appeal. However, Wright claimed that the Sixth
Amendment issue was raised on direct appeal and the court decided the issue
adversely to Wright. Thus, if Wright was correct, the Slayton rule plainly should
not have been applied and application of the rule to the case would clearly be
inconsistent with the rule's own terms. However, the court did not determine
whether or not the Sixth Amendment issue was ruled upon at direct appeal, thus
it did not actually decide if the rule was correctly applicable to the case or not.
It makes little sense to say that a procedural default rule is unquestionable if
adequate and independent, and then not determine if the rule meets the defini-
tion of adequate (i.e., consistent) or not. Thus, the court's conclusion that it
could not "question" procedural default in this case seems clearly to overlook
that there is a test of the rule which must be satisfied before it can reach its
unquestionable conclusion.
The court did conclude that even if it reached the issue of whether or not
the Sixth Amendment claim had been ruled upon, it would have ruled that tie
Supreme Court of Virginia did not rule upon the issue." While it is in question
whether or not the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled upon or even heard the Sixth
Amendment issue, Wright demonstrates the need for appellate counsel to ensure
that the record reflects presentation of claims to the state court. In Duncan v.
Henry,33 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that in order to preserve
the right to collateral review of an issue in federal court, the defendant must have
fairly presented the issue to the state court. It is important to note, however, that
the requirement is only that the claim be presented. If it is, default cannot be
awarded whether the state court rules upon the claim or not.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Wright contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffec-
tive. 4 Wright based one of his claims on the fact that his trial counsel failed to
32. lIright, 151 F.3d at 159 n.4.
33. 513 U.S. 364,366 (1995) (per curiam).
34. Wright claimed four reasons why his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Wright
claimed (1) that his trial counsel, in preparation for his juvenile court transfer proceeding, failed to
investigate mental health records that suggested that Wright suffered from mental disabilities;
(2) that his trial counsel failed to object to the trial court's jurisdiction over the attempted rape and
murder subsequent to an attempted rape charges which were not presented to the juvenile court;
(3) that his trial counsel failed to investigate the court-appointed mental health expert before
counsel recommended him; and (4) that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present significant
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Wright, 151 F.3d at 160. All four claims
were rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia under the test of Stricklandv. Wasbington, 466 U.S.
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conduct an investigation of Dr. Stanton Samenow ("Samenow") before recom-
mending him to the court as a mental health expert. The court rejected the
claim," but there is much to learn from the disposition of this claim.
During the prosecution's cross-examination of Samenow, Wright's counsel
learned for the first time that Samenow was a co-author of a study which con-
cluded that mental illness and environment are not responsible for people com-
mitting crimes, but instead that criminals commit crimes because they believe
they have an ability to get away with the crimes. Furthermore, Samenow testified
that he did not believe Wright was delusional, suffered hallucinations, or was
mentally ill. As the court stated, "[o]bviously this testimony dealt quite a blow
to Wright's mitigation defense." '36 Wright's counsel even admitted that had he
known about Samenow's studies, he would not have used him as his court-
appointed mental health expert. The court even conceded under Strickland v.
Washingto 7 that the trial counsel's failure to investigate Samenow was unreason-
able.3" Noting that Samenow had offered some miiating testimony, the court
denied relief under the prejudice prong of Strickland.39
The failure of defense counsel to provide objectively reasonable assistance,
under Strickland, in use of a mental mitigation expert, as the court assumed
without deciding, is instructive on the subject of proper use of such experts.
First, obviously, defense counsel must investigate potential expert witnesses and
must not retain or permit appointment of Samenow or experts like him.
Second, under VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 ("3:1"), defense counsel can
request the court to appoint an expert to assist the defense in its preparations of
mental evidence relevant to sentencing, just as the defense counsel requested an
expert and got Samenow in this case.' Under 3:1, this expert creates a report for
the defense counsel which specifically addresses certain questions relevant to the
defendant's mental status.4 . However, if defense counsel decides to have this
appointed expert testify at trial, 3:1 provides that the Commonwealth is entitled
to receive the report prepared by the expert for defense counsel and that the
Commonwealth may have an examination of the defendant performed by its own
court-appointed expert.42 For this reason, while it is essential that defense
668 (1984). The Fourth Circuit held that, in each case, the Supreme Court of Virginia's rejection
of Wright's claim was not an unreasonable application of Stickland Thus, the court upheld the
rejection of all four claims. Wright, 151 F.3d at 161-63.
35. Wright, 151 F.3d at 161-62.
36. Id. at 161.
37. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that to satisfy a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
a defendant must show that his attorney's conduct was unreasonable and that such conduct
prejudiced the defendant).
38. Wright, 151 F.3d at 162.
39. Id
40. See VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1998).
41. See VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-264.3:1 (C) (Michie 1998).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (Michie 1998).
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counsel use any court-appointed experts to understand, prepare, and present
mental evidence, it may not always be wise to actually call the court-appointed
expert to testify at trial.43 As seen in this case, because defense counsel called
Samenow to testify at trial, he enabled the Commonwealth to have an examina-
tion of the defendant done by the likes of Dr. Centor, who in this case, as usual,
delivered damaging testimony which predicted that Wright would be a danger in
,the future." Thus, defense counsel should seriously consider using 3:1 expert
witnesses as full members of the defense team, but short of actually calling the
expert to testify at trial.
Third, this case shows that a need can arise for more than one expert. For
example, in this case, reports existed which suggested that Wright may have
suffered from organic brain dysfunction. Organic brain dysfunction is, by
definition, a problem with the physical organ of the brain. This means the
problem is one which would probably be more properly diagnosed by a medical
doctor, who has the benefit of cat-scans and other devices to determine if the
brain is organically proper, than by a psychologist or psychiatrist. While a
psychologist or psychiatrist may be able to identify the symptoms or behaviors
associated with organic brain disorder, a medical doctor would be able to diag-
nose the actual existence of the disorder. However, Wright's counsel only
solicited the opinions of Samenow, Dr. Centor, the Commonwealth's mental
expert, and Dr. Mauer, the court-appointed juvenile evaluator, to determine if
Wright suffered from organic brain dysfunction. "s Each of these threepsycholo-
gists, including Samenow, informed Wright's counsel that they did not think
Wright suffered from organic brain dysfunction, however, none of them were
likely the best qualified to lend expert opinions on the topic. So, while a psycho-
logical expert such as Samenow was helpful for other aspects of the defense, an
additional expert probably would have been useful to help the defense determine
whether Wright suffered from organic brain dysfunction or not.
To obtain additional experts, counsel can rely on the language of 3:1 itself.
In section A of 3:1, the statute states that the court may appoint "one or more
qualified mental health experts."'  However, the language may limit the type of
expert to mental health experts. To obtain other kinds of experts, defense
counsel can seek expert assistance underAke v. Oklahoma.47 Under Ake, if sanity
is to be an issue at trial, the State is constitutionally required to assure that the
43. This is in part because of recent bizarre interpretations of 3:1 by the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit. For an insightful discussion of tactical decisions surrounding the
use of expert testimony in mental mitigation, see Douglas S. Collica, A'ce in WonderlandInterp retations:
Rethinking the Use of MentalMitigation Experts, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 1, p. 57 (1996); see also Case
Note of Satino v. Murra, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 1, p. 21 (1996); Case Note of Stewart v. Angelone,
11 CAP. DEF.J. 137 (1998).
44. W right, 151 F.3d at 162.
45. Id.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie 1998) (emphasis added).
47. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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defendant has access to a competent psychiatrist." Although Ake was limited to
psychiatric experts, in Caldwell v. Missirsipi,49 the Supreme Court of the United
States later implied that due process may require more than just psychiatric
experts. In Husske v. Commonwealth, ° the Supreme Court of Virginia read Ake
and Caldwell together to mean that a defendant is entitled to non-psychiatric
expert witnesses if he can show that assistance of such an expert is likely to be
a significant factor in his defense and that he will be prejudiced by a lack of
expert assistance."' Thus, under Ake, Ca/dwelland Husske, defense counsel can
seek psychiatric or non-psychiatric expert assistance, in addition to other experts
appointed under 3:1.2
Jason Solomon
48. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
49. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
50. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
51. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-927 (Va. 1996).
52. The showings required to obtain experts under Ake and Husske, however, are extensive.
Counsel are invited to consult the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for assistance on this issue.
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